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Higher education in the U.S. may be characterized by complexity and plurality of forms. 
The Ivy League universities and those trying to replicate them, or so-called “wanna be” 
universities, coexist with numerous large public institutions, four-year colleges and community 
colleges. While the former are actively involved in business-driven projects in research and 
services, the latter are quite distant from these processes. Nevertheless, all of them serve the 
industries, first of all by training professionals for these industries. In this sense community 
colleges are not less linked to businesses than major research universities. Curriculum in 
community colleges is tailored to meet the demands of specific industries and more so often 
local labor markets. Woshburn (2005) presents the negative sides of the impact of industries on 
the academia in the book titled University Incorporated: The Corporate Corruption of American 
Higher Education. This book would be of high interest for policymakers, managers, and theorists. 
While policymakers, university administrators, and business managers will appreciate good 
description of forms of cooperation of industries and universities as well as problems that such 
cooperation creates or exacerbates and some of the prescriptions, offered by the author, theorists 
will find wealth of material on which to build some concepts and theories of social and ethical 
responsibility versus commercialization and perhaps even some interesting niches for possible 
corrupt activities in higher education. 
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Overview of the problem 
Idea of external impact comes from the title of the book that emphasizes “corruption 
of…” Corruption here means erosion, negative influence, and external forces affecting internal 
values. Corruption is denoted as a process, not a product or outcome. Commercialization of 
higher education carries threat to traditional mission and internal values of academia. The author 
makes this argument from the position of traditionalism and position of effectiveness of the 
system. For us this approach appears to be somewhat unclear. If producing good specialists for 
industries is good and is a primary function of higher education, then why producing products, 
such as research and services, for industries represent corruption? 
Higher education in the U.S. may be characterized by complexity and plurality of forms. 
The Ivy League universities and those trying to replicate them, or so-called “wanna be” 
universities, coexist with numerous large public institutions, four-year colleges and community 
colleges. While the former are actively involved in business-driven projects in research and 
services, the latter are quite distant from these processes. Nevertheless, all of them serve the 
industries, first of all by training professionals for these industries. In this sense community 
colleges are not less linked to businesses than major research universities. Curriculum in 
community colleges is tailored to meet the demands of specific industries and more so often 
local labor markets. 
Plurality of forms of higher education is reflected in multiplicity of functions of higher 
education institutions. Research universities are multifunctional institutions. The major functions 
of these institutions are provision of healthcare services, research, and educational services. By 
number of employees, clients served, and total volume of transactions healthcare services are on 
the lead and dominate the agenda. Research is a second most important function and provision of 
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instructional services is the third one. Distribution of faculty time allotted to certain activities is 
the key in understanding structure of modern research university. It is incorrect to argue that just 
because research or medical services dominate instruction, university functioning is corrupt. 
Clear rules along with understanding about who is paying for what and how much are necessary 
for a fare game. 
If impact of marketization is negative, it does not mean that the idea of close cooperation 
between universities and industries is not good. May be mechanisms are not good enough or may 
be they have yet to be developed and reach high degree of effectiveness, as it may be the case 
with on-line degrees and e-commerce. Washburn prefers to focus on some particular industries 
and then on “hot potatoes.” One should keep in mind that despite of the strong external influence 
and authority of external Boards of Trust, U.S. universities are hard to abuse simply because the 
system is not in its infancy. 
There are two major issues to be focused on: 
• Time as a strategic resource; 
• Changes in the national economy. 
Distribution of time between research, instruction, and other functions for faculty and 
graduate students constitutes same problem as may be found in medical practices and legal 
practices. Lawyers tend to get more clients than they can actually serve with the declared and 
expected level of quality. The same is true for doctors, forced to run the patient conveyer under 
the pressure from the hospital management. Time here is a major resource and allocation of time 
should be of major concern. Underserved clients, be it patients or students are potential victims 
of abuse through the allocation of time that deviates from the norms, terms, and conditions 
described in the contracts and regulated by the legislation. 
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Structural changes in the national economy are another major consideration. As 
biomedical industry is growing, more research is needed to develop and advance the industry. 
Research universities adjust their research facilities and curriculum accordingly. Preparing more 
professionals for biomedical industry is a socially responsible change to the benefit of the society. 
It should not be regarded as corruption even if it comes at the expense of liberal arts education. 
Increase in research in biomedical and related fields is also beneficial for the public and should 
not be regarded as corruption. There is an ongoing debate about the optimal timeline for secured 
patents and intellectual property rights, but the right itself is an incentive to advance the frontier 
of knowledge. 
Washburn (2005) presents the following view on restriction of access to inventions and 
other research findings through patents that might be detrimental to economic development and 
public interest: “A group of fifty-nine leading economists and scientists—including Nobel 
laureates Joseph Stiglitz (2001, economics) and John Sulston (2002, medicine)—wrote a public 
letter to the World Intellectual Property Organization, asking that it begin promoting more 
“open” models of innovation that don’t rely on patents. There is evidence, the letter asserted, that 
a high level of innovation can be achieved in some areas of the economy without proprietary 
protection, and that ‘excessive, unbalanced, or poorly designed intellectual property protections 
may be counterproductive.’ The property rights thicket has grown so dense post-Bayh-Dole that 
some worry the end result will be to hamper rather than foster innovation. As Richard Nelson 
wrote in 2003, we must not forget that ‘the market part of this Capitalist engine rests on a 
publicly supported scientific commons.” (p. 154) Washburn seems to be underestimating 
meaning of financial security of universities and necessity to fund fundamental as well as applied 
research. The key here is a clash between exogenous and endogenous changes. 
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Structure of the work 
Washburn develops the following structure in her work. First, she states the problem in 
general and makes introduction a complete mimicry of the entire book. Then she substantiates 
the problem with use of the numerous examples. Historical excurse into the business-university 
relations highlights major points of the work, while allowing the reader to understand historically 
developed views on such relationship as well as cases of the relationship, some of which are 
successful and others are failures. The structure is presented in Figure 1. 
The problems that may be encountered while considering the structure of the book 
generally related to the weak theorizing and absence of any strong methodology. 
Conceptualization, presented in Part 3 does not convert into theories. An attempt for 
generalization in parts six, seven, and eight is de facto continuous line of cases and examples 
instead of theorizing. Prescription, given by the author in part nine is linked to generalization, but 
it is not strong enough. It is rather linked to part two that illuminates lessons of the history. 
The entire book is filled with cases and examples from biomedical industry and medicine. 
At the same time the author’s position creates an impression that the importance of new 
healthcare-related sciences is not fully recognized or accepted. The author apparently refuses to 
admit the fact that closer link between business and academia is unavoidable. 
 7
Substantiation of the problem 
History 
Conceptualization 
(market model) 
Science Healthcare Focus on two major industries 
Generalization 
(business vs. mission) 
Development of generalization 
(problems) 
Development of generalization 
(consequences) 
Prescription 
(ideal world) 
Statement of the problem 
 
Figure 1. Structure of the “University Incorporated…” 
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First, healthcare industry already constitutes 16 percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
product and is rapidly growing. This totals to around 1.9 trillion dollars a year. This figure is 
larger than the entire gross domestic product of most of the world economies. Not only an 
industry of such scale may not be ignored, but it constitutes fundamental base for further 
development of business-university links and commercialization of higher education. 
Second, time of philosophy as a cornerstone of liberal education is gone. It is true for 
Europe, the former USSR, and even more so for the U.S. In fact, philosophy itself tries its best to 
enter such areas of research and practice as law, medicine, public policy with emphasis on 
healthcare policy and education, etc. in order to prove its continuous relevance and justify its 
presence on campuses. Bioethics, qualitative research methods, public health policy, business 
ethics, and other sub-disciplines include elements of philosophical thinking. 
The link between industries and universities is not limited to flows of ideas, patents, 
services, contracts, orders, and money. People move between industry and academia as well. 
Administrators, managers, professionals, professors, research professors, residents, post-docs, 
visiting fellows all may be met in this “channel of exchange.”  
Academic community is eager to stand to its traditions, especially its part that does not 
draw substantial benefits from the university commercialization. Good illustration for such 
resistance would be recent events at Cornell University that eventually led to resignation of its 
president. While Cornell’s president was pushing the agenda more towards biomedical and 
medical research and international outreach as directions for the future development, the Board 
of Trustees along with the faculty body of the institution stood for the values of liberal education. 
However, the case of Cornell University is rather specific. The University itself is located in the 
middle of nowhere and has to struggle to attract major airline carriers to the local airport, while 
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the University Hospital and the Medical School are located in New York City. Location of the 
hospital is explained by its connection to the patients, i.e. clientele. Medical school, with its 
professional curriculum, is indivisible from the hospital. This is a good example of dominance of 
the industry with its professional values and market orientation over the academic preferences. 
Here industry takes a leading role. 
Obviously, a link between business and academia exists, it is becoming stronger, and it 
influences universities and their structural policies. Nevertheless, such link should not be 
overestimated. There is no single case of merger or acquisition of any higher education 
institution by an industrial corporation. Furthermore, industries prefer not directly interfere with 
academic processes. Companies prefer to choose among the pool of applicants from different 
schools rather than funding particular programs in particular schools. This might be the strongest 
evidence of how far the industries are from academic world. This distancing may well be 
explained by the situation on the labor market and growing industry of higher education itself. 
One thing is undeniable: so far businesses only voice their needs for professionals with particular 
skills; they do not place orders or requests for future specialists in particular departments or 
universities, and they do not fund such programs. 
 
Marketization of higher education 
The author considers marketization as a threat to higher education, threat to excellence. 
Influence of commercialization and business-like operated universities is described as the 
following: 
“These developments are hardly a secret to university presidents, administrators, 
professors, and students, many of whom have watched their campuses take on the look 
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and feel of shopping malls in recent years, replete with Starbucks, fast-food chains, and 
Barnes-and-Noble-operated bookstores. Thus far, however, their collective significance 
has yet to reverberate in popular consciousness. Ask the typical parent what are the big 
issues in higher education today, and you are likely to hear about the rising cost of tuition, 
or how competitive the admissions process has become. Missing from their list of 
concerns is the single greatest threat to the future of American higher education: the 
intrusion of market ideology into the heart of academic life.” (p. x) 
This passage illustrates change in form, appearance, auxiliary facilities, but not 
necessarily in essence of the system. More importantly, such a priory negative attitude towards 
the recent changes seems to be an over-dramatization of the objective processes which gradually 
add pace. Harvard University is run by Harvard Corporation that manages $30 billion 
endowment invested in stocks and bonds and some assets overseas. 
Blumenstyk (2005) reports that the year 2004 was marked in higher education by a record 
number of start-up companies. Inventions generated high revenues and many were patented and 
licensed by the government. New York University received the highest licensing income of 
$109,023,125 in 2004. MIT was a leader in terms of start-up companies, founding 20 companies. 
U.S. government has issued 270 patents to the University of California system. MIT was the 
leading single institution in terms of number of patents issued, 159. California Institute of 
Technology holds the second place with 142 patents. Total research spending in the University 
of California system mounted to $2,791,777,000. For Johns Hopkins University it was 
$1,594,724,411 and for MIT it was $1,027,000,000. The data indicate how close the links 
between academia, industries, and the government are. 
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Negative impact of industries on higher education 
Washburn holds to the idea of negative impact on the quality of instruction and notices 
that “the job of teaching students was shunted to the side, even though the universities’ most 
important public function was to nurture intellectual creativity and talent.” (p. x) In our view, the 
emphasis should be made on the word “was.” The author focuses on negative impact of patenting, 
licensing, and other ways of limiting access to inventions and research products on the total 
social welfare. She notes that “When researchers at the University of Utah discovered an 
important human gene responsible for hereditary breast cancer, for example, they didn’t make it 
freely available to other scientists, even though we—the U.S. taxpayers—paid $4.6 million to 
finance the research. They raced to patent it and gave the monopoly rights to Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., a start-up company founded by a University of Utah professor, which proceeded to hoard 
the gene and restrict other scientists from using it.” (p. xi) Washburn rightly captures the need for 
better and more specific governmental regulations in the sphere of usage of applied research 
findings so to ensure that publicly funded research is to serve the best public interest first. 
Simply put, the government, as a contractor, should specify how products of publicly funded 
research are to be used and who are to benefit from it. While some research projects result in 
nothing but academic publications, others bring millions of dollars in revenues. 
Negative impact on academic research and scholarship may take different forms. 
Washburn states that secrecy and delays in publication of research findings are a norm for the 
last two decades. She asserts that “Were the federal government to engage in some of the 
practices detailed in the chapters to come—preventing students form publishing their theses on 
time (in order to protect proprietary secrets), deleting information from academic papers prior to 
publication, suppressing research studies that uncover significant health threats—it would surely 
 12
provoke public outrage. The commercial sector’s routine violation of these academic norms has 
been met with comparative silence.” (p. xi) The author mentions bureaucratic red tape while 
describing political debates and lobbying of medical research laboratories’ interests in Congress 
(p. 67). The lobbying took place in regard of patenting medical findings that represented 
commercial value. 
One should not discard the possibility of some public officials to be corrupt and public 
offices and departments to pursue their institutional interests. Discretion is one of the conditions 
for corruption and salience is one of the reasons corruption goes unidentified or unpunished. 
High degree of amalgamation of government and business is a characteristic of every nation and 
the U.S. is not an exception to it. 
 
Changing structure of higher education 
Idea of changing structure of higher education is based on both changes in internal 
structures of higher education institutions and changes in structures of external relations. 
Washburn notes that “The new commercial ethos in higher education is affecting more than just 
sciences and engineering. It is also changing the priorities of universities in ways that rise 
disturbing questions about what parents and students are getting in return for the increasingly 
steep tuitions they pay.” (p. xii) Changing structure of the national economy along with the 
tightening links between industries and universities lead to changing structures of universities 
themselves. Changing external demands lead to changes in priorities within academia. The 
author summarizes this in the following way: “Indeed, with the exception of the smaller liberal 
arts colleges, the job of undergraduate education often seems like a subsidiary activity at many 
universities today—a task farmed out to the growing army of part-time instructors who receive 
 13
no benefits and meager pay. As one disillusioned grad student explained to me: “Your first 
semester, the administration makes it clear what the real priorities are: ‘We’ve got to fill seats. 
We need a body in front of the classroom. Go teach.’” If you want to succeed in academia, he 
said, what matters are publications, prestige, and grant money. “Forget about teaching. Forget 
about broadening young people’s minds. Whatever you do, don’t spend a lot of time on that. It’s 
a waste of time.” (p. xiii) Yet another opinion indicates concern about abuse of university name 
or brand and prestige in the Enron case: “Harvard University should apologize to the people of 
California for having sold its research institutes and faculty members to corporations,’ concluded 
HarvardWatch, the student and alumni group that investigated and uncovered these ties.” (p. xvii) 
This is a good example of indirect participation in corporate fraud affecting alumni of the school 
through the school reputation. Watching reputation by the interested constituencies is important. 
However, at the end of the day each university will focus on what brings to it highest rate of 
return, be it healthcare, research, or instruction. The same will be true for each of these three 
divisions of university activities. 
Washburn notes that “Bayh-Dole revolutionized university-industry relations. Since the 
act passed, U.S universities have seen more than a tenfold increase in the patents they generate, 
and industry funding for academic research has expanded at an annual rate of 8.1 percent, rising 
to $2 billion in 2001—or five times more than in 1980. Although industry still supplies roughly 7 
percent of overall university research funding, its support has grown faster than from any other 
single source, and its influence is generally thought to be far greater than this percentage would 
suggest.” (p. 9) Due to the practice of matching and cost sharing, the industry now influences 
around 25 percent of university research funding. This is consistent with Congress’s mandate to 
transfer academic knowledge to the marketplace for the public’s benefit. 
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Growing burden to the students is obvious. Since 1980, college tuition and fees at public 
universities have increased at three times the rate of inflation, rising over 50 percent in real terms 
over the past decade alone. More loans caused average cumulative debt for a graduating senior to 
rise from $9,800 in 1992 to $18,000 in 2000 (xiii). At the same time, share of the state funding 
for public universities consistently decreases. Washburn notes that “At Penn State the state’s 
contribution to core educational operations fell from 54 percent in 1976-1977 to 31 percent in 
2001-2002. The share of the University of Virginia’s budget coming from the state declined from 
roughly 28 percent in 1985 to just 8.1 percent in 2003.” (p. xiv) The author asserts that most of 
the nation’s public universities and colleges experienced same decline in state funding. This may 
have negative impact on accessibility of higher education as well as the financial burden of 
graduating students. Even though this information can be considered as an attempt to establish an 
argument about the monetary base for corrupt activities, it appears to be irrelevant. 
 
Abuse 
False expectations along with abuse of public money constitute abuse in higher education. 
False expectations of students to be taught by professors and not teaching assistants, unmet 
expectations of recent graduates to find a job in industry, and parents’ frustrations about the 
quality of education are all results of poorly specified conditions and breach of contract between 
the clients and providers of educational services and not necessarily between public in general 
and universities in general. In order to enforce the rules and prevent numerous forms of abuse in 
many activities of the universities their consideration should be extended from the realms of 
ethical and social responsibilities into the realms of economic and legal responsibilities. 
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Another form of false expectations comes from ungrounded or poorly calculated attempts 
to replicate sound success stories for narrow political reasons or even in pursuit of public benefit. 
As the author points out, state governors and legislators “have exacerbated this trend by pushing 
universities to pour resources into commercially oriented research centers, in fields like medicine 
and biotechnology, hoping to spawn ‘the next Silicon Valley’ in their backyards. Many of these 
same politicians have been considerably less generous when it comes to financing the 
universities’ general funds (which actually go toward educating students).” (p. xiii) 
Abuse of public money through the system of public higher education institutions, 
presented by the author, is not explicitly clear: “U.S. colleges and universities, whether they are 
public or private, enjoy enormous levels of public subsidy: basic science; liberal education; 
independent, publishable research. Every year, the federal government pays roughly $20 billion 
in taxpayer money to subsidize the research at our nation’s colleges and universities, and another 
$60 billion more in loans and grants to help financially disadvantaged students attend these 
schools. At the state and local levels, taxpayer contributions to higher education now run around 
$68 billion. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Americans carefully put aside their hard-
earned income to pay for tuition, room and board, books, and other expenses needed to send their 
kids to college. It is up to them—up to all of us—to make sure that the world of higher education 
is not for sale.” (p. xx) This may be regarded as a reason why deviations from the prime mission 
can be considered as corruption, even though it all has to be quantified. 
Another form of abuse is related to misinforming the public about the assets, valuations, 
or other market or corporate conditions by using prestige of university professors or name of the 
school as well as abuse of the school name by the faculty who become involved in such unethical 
or illegal activities. The example presented by Washburn targets faculty members at Harvard: 
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“Enron paid handsome consulting fees to several professors at the Harvard Business School, 
which produced a series of glowing studies about the company that would soon make headlines 
for its accounting scandals.” (p. xvii) 
Washburn targets some of the problematic issues in higher education industry, paints it in 
dark colors and means it to be corruption, even though she does not name it as such. This process 
of labeling problematic issues should be at least complimented by identification of potential 
niches for corruption in its legal and economic senses, as follows from the finding that: “In some 
labs it’s routine to still other people’s work. Too often the junior scientists are willing to be 
abused. They know their advisor is stealing their work, but they think they need to stay and get a 
good recommendation.” (p. 85) Many students are interested in copyrighting their research and 
limiting public access to it in anticipation of future contracts and employment. 
Legal aspects of industry-university relations are subjects of tax policy, antitrust 
regulations, and patent laws. Fairweather (1988) suggests that: “The resolution of conflicting 
legal positions through contractual means is a prerequisite to establishing industry-university 
liaisons, particularly research relationships. These legal issues concern patent rights, copyrights, 
royalties, and other intellectual property rights; commingling of industrial and federal research 
funds; and use of corporate or university name.” (p. 48) Secrecy and proprietary rights that 
threaten promotion of open publication of research results as well as the merit based choice of 
research topics are also issues. 
University administrators should be cautious about taking equities in for-profit 
organizations (Peters and Fusfeld, 1983, p. 112), and be ready to govern potential conflicts of 
interest resulting from faculty entrepreneurship (Fowler, 1984; Johnson, 1984; Kenney, 1986; 
Wofsy, 1986). Latest investigations conducted in 2007 by the Attorney General of the State of 
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New York Mr. Cuomo point toward possible corrupt links between colleges and educational 
loans industry as well as abuse of office by some financial aid officers (Field and Keller, 2007). 
 
Changing realities 
Washburn quotes Nussbaum saying: “When we ask about the relationship of a liberal 
education to citizenship, we are asking a question with a long history in the Western 
philosophical tradition. We are drawing on Socrates’ concept of “the examined life,” on 
Aristotle’s notions of a reflective citizenship, and above all on Greek and Roman Stoic notions of 
an education that is “liberal” in that it liberates the mind from the bondage of habit and custom, 
producing people who can function with sensitivity and alertness as citizens of the whole world.” 
(p. xix) This takes us back to ancient schools of thought and medieval universities of Bologna 
and Paris. 
Medieval universities as predecessors of the modern higher education institutions were 
mostly irrelevant to the systems of production existed in the dark ages. Knowledge, generated in 
universities as well as educated individuals were not utilized on a systemic basis in national 
economy. In fact, there was no such thing as a national economy at that time (Osipian, 2007). 
Pre-industrial era may be characterized by low level productivity without substantial innovations 
on the basis of non-economic incentives for humans to participate in production, i.e. “human in 
production.” In the industrial era that continues till now universities serve needs of the industry 
and humans are attached to industrial production through mostly economic incentives, i.e. 
“humans for production.” This is true for the U.S. with its market economy as well as for the 
USSR with its planned economy and manpower forecasting. One may only speculate that in the 
future there will be “production for human”, and not otherwise. This futuristic view may well 
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justify prerogative of liberal education and liberation of university from its servitude for the 
industry. The author seems to be jumping ahead to this stage of futurism by stating that: “To 
question the growing commercialization of our universities is not to denigrate the value of 
markets themselves. The problem arises when markets are presumed to be so perfect—so 
superior to any other form of social organization—that they are permitted to penetrate areas 
formerly governed by other considerations.” (p. xvii) Washburn refers to a philosophy professor 
at the University of Massachusetts who cautioned that “The point at which we look to nothing 
but demand to determine what a university should offer is the point at which the market becomes 
the enemy of excellence.” (p. xiv) 
Washburn points out that “in comparison with their European counterparts, universities in 
the United States have always displayed a strong utilitarian bent. In founding the University of 
Virginia in 1825, Thomas Jefferson sought to provide ‘an useful American education.’ He 
recommended the study of agriculture because ‘it is the first in utility,’ and expressed 
appreciation of the natural sciences, civil history, and law because of their direct application to 
nation building.” (p. 26) 
Utilitarianism and industry orientation of American universities is obvious. This is how 
the author describes process of establishing schools of applied sciences: “From 1824 to 1861 an 
array of new technical schools were built—Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (1824), Harvard’s 
Lawrence Scientific School (1847), Yale Sheffield Scientific School (1847), and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (1861)—precisely in order to meet the needs of a 
modernizing society.” (p. 30) Creation of the science programs in the universities does not 
contradict to pursuit of public interest. Washburn notices that: “The commitment to public 
service was perhaps best exemplified by the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Founded in 
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1848 to give ‘the whole people of the state an educational instruction suited to their wants,’ the 
university gradually extended its educational programs to serve the needs of local agriculture, 
industry, and government.” (p. 31) 
The time of altruism and charitable donations is gone and will never be back. The system 
becomes more and more practical and operates on the rational basis. The charity is in most of the 
instances based on altruism, not rationality. It is normal for donors to expect something in return. 
Donations are replaced with contracts and orders. As individual’s education is considered more 
and more as an investment, so is private contribution to higher education institution becomes 
more of an investment rather than just a charity. This is normal within the frame of rational 
behavior. More and more for profit business-like colleges and universities emerge and 
successfully function in the U.S. Some of these universities establish and operate branches 
abroad, and some of the large educational corporations buy shares in foreign universities. As 
market is already present in higher education and higher education itself is already an industry, it 
is unrealistic to either ignore objectivity and rationality of such processes or describe them as 
corrupt. 
Washburn presents very interesting perspective on the governance and concept of 
independency of U.S. universities, both private and public. While it is generally accepted that in 
distinction of their counterparts in other countries U.S. universities traditionally enjoy substantial 
or full degree of independency, and namely independency from the government, the author states 
that this independency is not perfect. She notices that university self-governance always was and 
still is an issue: “Not such latitude existed in America, where academic scholars failed to win 
these powers of self-governance. The founders of the first two colonial colleges, Harvard, and 
William and Mary, initially sought to emulate the European tradition of faculty control but after 
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a brief period of dual governance opted to transfer authority to an external board of laymen 
trustees, known as overseers or visitors… In time, the faculty would win broad powers over 
hiring and curricular decisions (and even some measure of participation in university 
governance), but the legacy of external control inevitably had the effect of making American 
universities more susceptible to outside influence.” (pp. 28, 29) Relative freedom from the 
government and self-governance alone do not constitute institutional independency. Even if they 
would, independency does not prevent universities or some faculty members and administrators 
to benefit from ethically thin or corrupt activities. 
Washburn names religious, state, and business institutions as the major forces of 
influencing academia in different moments in time: “Much of what we value most about higher 
education today—academic freedom, the commitment to open inquiry and disinterested research, 
the ideal of a well-rounded education—exists because such voices warned against allowing 
external forces (religious authorities, the government, the private sector) to threaten these 
distinctive values.” (p. 27) As religious agenda is gone and the state agenda is narrowing down to 
different forms of regulatory control and decreasing funding, corporate world’s influence on 
academia is strong as never before. U.S. universities are very complex institutions and at the 
same time very open ones. As they become more effective and efficient in producing certain 
products and services, they become more subjected to the diseases of the corporate world, such 
as financial fraud, white-collar crime, embezzlement, abuse of publicly funded enterprises etc. 
These are all niches to search for corruption. Tripartite system that includes government, higher 
education, and business is now transforming into bipolar world with the regulatory restrictions 
from the government on one hand and industries, including commercializing industry of higher 
education on the other hand. As it might be of a surprise, it comes along with the Washburn’s 
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prescriptions for saving the nature of higher education. She suggests independent, third party 
licensing for quality, amending Bayh-Dole Act, strengthening federal conflict of interest 
regulations for faculty, administrators, and managers, and federal oversight of clinical research. 
What does not fit into this view is her idea of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. 
 
Discussion 
One of the aspects of the discussion about the role of higher education industry in 
modernizing world and influence of the corporate world on it lies in the understanding of 
whether the universities were “invited” to participate in the market economy or they were 
actively seeking such participation. Oblinger and Verville (1998) point out the following: “If you 
ask almost anyone in business or industry why they are concerned about higher education, three 
responses would dominate: We need employees who come to our business ready to work; We 
desperately need teachers who can help improve achievement in K-12 Education; We need a 
system of lifelong learning for all of our citizens.” (p. 19) 
This approach appears to be as limited as it can possibly be. It ignores view of higher 
education as an industry and a part of the corporate world as well as an important consumer of all 
kinds of goods and services that industries supply to higher education institutions. Needless to 
say that as universities are significant providers of healthcare services, such approach does not 
capture even half of what may be by now regarded as a product of higher education industry. 
One thing it expresses clearly is the fact that education exists for industry, i.e. “human is for 
production.” 
Referring to Ashford (1983) and Caldert (1983), Fairweather (1988) asserts that “A major 
tenet of academe is that faculty control the selection of research topics and the methods of 
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conducting research. The concept of “academic freedom” also includes the obligation to 
encourage the free flow of information through publication and a variety of other mechanisms.” 
(p. 49) Washburn favors this way of organizing research and defining its priorities and directions 
for development, while Newfield presents the opposite point of view by stating that “Industry did 
not respond to its economic problems by imposing itself on the university. The university 
actively pursued closer relations with industry. Nor did university administrators impose industry 
sponsorship on reluctant faculty. Faculty actively pursued this sponsorship.” (Newfield, 2003, p. 
174) 
Market-based incentives lead to rational behavior among faculty and university 
administrators that in its turn leads to marketization of higher education institutions. These 
transformational processes may be described in a more detailed way as the following: market 
relations materialize and develop in specific industries, including knowledge-intensive ones that 
often consist of professional organizations; industries signal about their needs, including needs in 
high skilled labor force, know-how, and research to higher education institutions; needs of the 
industries shape the demand on products, produced by universities; this demand, i.e. ability and 
willingness of industries to pay initiates rational behavior among faculty, administrators etc.; 
rational behavior, when reaches certain threshold, leads to changes in university structure, 
priorities, functions, and mission; finally, it leads to explicit market orientation of the universities, 
also known as commercialization, and abuse of the system in different ways. 
Abuse of the system may be a result of rational behavior and it may be derived from 
commercialization. The streamline of transformation of market relations into commercialization 
of higher education and abuse of university mission as well as different functions of higher 
education institutions is presented on the Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Transformation of market relations into commercialization and abuse 
 
For this scheme, Washburn sees corruption as a process at the stage of “Incentives” and 
corruption as an outcome at the stage of “Rational behavior.” We would suggest focusing on the 
stage of “Commercialization,” as a base for corruption, and most of all on ‘Abuse” that comes 
directly from the “Rational behavior” and indirectly through “Commercialization.” Link between 
“Rational behavior” and “Commercialization” may also be considered as perversion of purpose, 
but only when it can really be characterized as such. 
 
Categorization of corruption 
One of the weak sides of the work is that the author does not derive different possible 
categorizations of corruption in higher education institutions from the white-collar crime 
literature, microeconomics, development economics, principal-agent theories, public policy etc., 
including categorization by severity of the crime, type of crime, or operational function. One 
may establish four categorizations that might be useful in conducting research on corruption in 
higher education. These include motive, legal vs. illegal, where corruption occurs, and intensity 
of corruption (Segal, 2004). 
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One should not consider four approaches to categorizing corruption, including motive, 
legal vs. illegal, where corruption occurs, and intensity of corruption, as exhaustive. Hallak and 
Poisson (2007) present a compelling review of several categorizations of corruption along with a 
conceptual frame for corruption in education. Such synthesis allows for appreciation of the 
complexity of the phenomenon of education corruption. Further categorization of corruption is 
necessary in the fields of higher education policy, economics, and management. 
Different authors use the word corruption in different contexts, expressing different 
meanings. The word comes from the Latin corruptio, which in Medieval Latin expressed a moral 
decay, wicked behavior, putridity, rottenness. It was consistent with the classical notion of 
corruption, comprising in the ancient Greece less the actions of individuals than the moral health 
of whole societies (Johnston, 1996, p. 322). The author should be given credit for capturing the 
essence of corruption in terms of corruptio, and differentiating between the two. Washburn states 
that negative influence of corporate world and the behavior of faculty and administrators lead to 
corruption in the functioning of the system, perverting educational purposes, i.e. negatively 
influencing processes of teaching and learning as well as independent fundamental research.  
This leads to the conversion of corruption as an illegal activity into corruptio as perversion of 
major purpose. 
Definitions of corruption and discussions of the category in fields of political science and 
economics may be found in works of Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996), Bardhan (1997), Berg, 
Hahn, and Schmidhauser (1976), Johnston (1982), Keller (1978), Lasswell and Rogow (1963), 
Noonan (1983), (Nye, 1967), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), Tirole (1992). Johnston summarizes 
the definitional problem: “We should not expect to find a sharp distinction between corruption 
and no corrupt actions. Instead, we will find fine gradations of judgment, reflecting a variety of 
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equivocations, mitigating circumstances, and attributed motives.” (Johnston, 1986, p. 379) 
Callow concludes that: “Perhaps the heart of the issue is not the kind of graft or who perpetrates 
it or even its magnitude but rather its impact upon the democratic process. Graft of any kind 
breeds distrust. Distrust breeds cynicism. Cynicism is the most powerful enemy of the 
democratic representative process.” (Callow, 1976, p. 144) Abuse of public interest as well as 
public funds, mentioned by the author on multiple occasions, creates negative feelings and 
distrust among the public in regard of higher education and corporate influence on academia in 
particular. 
The definition most cited in the political literature is given by Nye: “Corruption is 
behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of 
reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reasons of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding use).” (Nye, 1967, p. 419) Such definition 
is clearly limited to illegal or ethically questionable acts and does not fit into the Washburn’s 
agenda. 
Sayed and Bruce (1998) and Waite and Allen (2003) present a broad social approach to 
definition of corruption. Petrov and Temple (2004) apply a narrow definition of corruption that 
regards corruption as such only if it implies illegality. Definition of education corruption 
includes the abuse of authority for material gain (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996) and is defined 
as the abuse or misuse of public office or public trust for personal or private gain. Heyneman 
points to the fact that education is a public good and “… because education is an important 
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public good, its professional standards include more than just material goods; hence the 
definition of education corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well as material 
gain.” (Heyneman, 2004, p. 638) Corruption in the education sector can be defined as “the 
systematic use of public office for private benefit, whose impact is significant on the availability 
and quality of educational goods and services, and, as a consequence on access, quality or equity 
in education” (Hallak and Poisson, 2002). Hallak and Poisson (2007) maintain the systemic 
character of education corruption. Corruption in higher education may be defined as a system of 
informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets 
through abuse of the office of public or corporate trust (Osipian, 2007) 
 
Methodology 
While categorization of corruption was at the stages of its development and revision over 
the last two decades, methodology of studying corruption is at best in its infancy. There are two 
major methods applied in research on corruption. Economists tend to focus on survey-based 
quantitative methodologies. Due to the immanent secrecy and illegality of the subject matter of 
the research, one of the major challenges here is reliability of the data. Moreover, the research is 
focused on corruption in developing countries where obtaining reliable data is an immense 
challenge. In political science and public policy methodology of research on corruption is 
narrowed down to case studies and reminds more of investigations and journalistic-style 
commentaries rather than rigorous scholarly work. 
As may be seen from the most recent work on corruption in education (Segal, 2004; 
Washburn, 2005), case studies supplemented with superficial analysis constitute bulk of what 
might be interpreted as a research methodology. Multiplicity of cases of corruption referred to in 
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these studies pushes them beyond the borders of simple case study yet insufficient to move into 
the realm of quantitative research. At the same time this overload with cases does not carry with 
it sufficient portion of analysis and synthesis and other qualitative methods that would be of 
great benefit to the research. At this stage research on corruption in education, and higher 
education in particular, is almost nonexistent. Accordingly, methodology used in first attempts to 
research the issue may at best replicate methodology used in the field of development economics 
and in the field of public policy. As higher education becomes more of a business-like operated 
industry, methodology borrowed from the white-collar crime theories might also be of help. 
Import of categorical apparatus and research methodology from these fields and their adaptation 
to the field of education and higher education in particular might be the major task for research 
on education corruption. 
Development of research methodology in the fields of development economics and 
public policy will facilitate further development of categorical apparatus. These developments 
will further be utilized in studying corruption in education. 
Basic methodology that may be applied in studies of corruption in higher education may 
be formulated as the sequence of the following steps: 
• Identification and demonstration of relevant and necessary grounds for corruption 
to exist, including intensity of monetary transactions in the system; 
• Identification of preconditions for corruption to exist, including complexity of the 
system, presence of the comprehensive legal system, and discretion, delegated to 
public officials. All of these should be carefully weighted on the scale of their 
relative values, significance, and level of development. 
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• Specification of the necessary conditions for corruption. These may include 
imperfect legal system and imperfect market system. Defining conditions for 
corruption will depend upon the concepts and frames used to determine and 
categorize corruption. 
• Presenting evidence of corruption by using illustrative techniques borrowed from 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. 
• Describing building blocks of corruption in the industry. 
• Presenting system of corruption as a whole, with its net of interrelations and 
agents participating in such net. This will involve intensive use of method of 
analysis and synthesis and lead to generalizations. 
• Finally, generalization will be used as a platform or a starting point for deduction. 
Deduction will allow for identifying otherwise invisible pockets of corruption. 
Method of induction, proposed above, should be used in studying corruption in higher 
education based on particular cases is grounded in works of Baronov (2004), Bernard (2000), 
Dubs (1930), Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and Law (2004). 
Washburn offers an overview of the impact of industries on higher education institutions, 
based on history and numerous cases and not theories. Then she proceeds to more detailed cases. 
Numerous detailed cases are followed by generalizations, based on quotes and cases and not 
concepts or theories. These generalizations are incomplete; they do not serve as a base for 
deriving any theories and instead create more problems in understanding what is corrupt and 
what is not and why. One should approach the subject matter of this study from the position that 
the entire system of higher education in the U.S. is not corrupt. Consequently, the author should 
have chosen method of nomological deduction in order to identify corruption in the system. 
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First, general picture of higher education and its relations with business should be 
presented. This general picture should be supported by comprehensive statistics, not case by case 
figures, examples, and quotes. General overview and relevant statistical data should be used to 
present scientific description of the system. Precise multilateral description of the system will 
serve as a ground for investigating corruption in different aspects and from different standpoints. 
Second, different theoretical lenses should be applied to highlight different aspects of the 
system and its interrelations with businesses, public sector, and the government. This should be 
followed by method of analysis and synthesis that will lead to reproduction of the system in more 
concrete form. This process is also known as the rise from abstract to concrete. 
Third, based on the complete picture of the system obtained in the process of moving 
from abstract to concrete and analysis and synthesis, the author should define potential room for 
corruption. It may be done by the way of constructing hypotheses and testing them. Based on the 
knowledge of potential niches for corrupt activities, corruption should be searched for and if 
found, it will prove the hypotheses. 
Finally, cases of corruption should be further explained, and the investigative part of the 
research concluded. New knowledge, obtained during the process of investigation should add to 
already existing theories. 
Unfortunately, Washburn uses little of analysis and none of synthesis. Instead, she uses 
cases that lead to some ideas and further on to often unconvincing generalizations. All analysis is 
limited to the general overview of the system. Washburn does not look for pockets of corruption. 
Instead, she is trying to prove that due to some external influence the system of higher education 
in its essence becomes corrupt. In this context terms eroded or changed appear to be more 
appropriate than sound and attractive term corrupt. Process of adaptation does not lead to more 
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corruption or becoming more corrupt. The task of proving this appears to be very problematic. 
One can only try to argue for such things from theoretical grounds, including strong 
philosophical argumentation. Unfortunately, the author does not use them at all. Instead, she 
relies on cases, expressions, common sense, and leaves the judgment up to the reader. The reader 
is to decide whether each particular instance constitutes act of corruption or otherwise. 
To the author’s credit we should admit that some of the cases described do fall into the 
category of corruption, gross waste, or abuse. However, these cases are not further analyzed as 
was suggested in the sequence of nomological deduction. Normative judgments about good and 
bad for the system are not necessarily substitutes to judgments about corrupt or otherwise. Bad 
does not necessarily mean corrupt. Negative impact does not necessarily mean corruption and 
does not necessarily serve as a ground for corruption. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The author does not present the reader with comparative perspective of the researched 
issue. While elements of comparative approach, or simple comparisons, are used in several 
instances, they are not followed by a thorough analysis. Comparative approach is not applied on 
a systematic basis. Comparative analysis might be very beneficial to the work as the author 
attempts to justify the argument that influence of industries on academia corrupts the latter. 
Description of how this problem is resolved in Europe as well as in the USSR might be of 
especial value. While U.S. universities combine functions of education and research, in the 
former USSR research was a prerogative of research institutions, state owned entities that existed 
separately from academic institutions and in most of the cases were not accountable to the 
Ministry of Education. 
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The author presents good historical overview of the problem, illustrated by the numerous 
cases of business-university relations and projects as well as political debates and major 
decisions followed by the changes in legislation. However, the stages of development of 
influence of industries on academia and process of its corruption are not explicitly stated in the 
book. The book is overloaded with very illustrative examples of commercialization or 
corruptness of industry-university relations and many figures are presented in order to support 
the author’s argumentation. Nevertheless, the book does not present the whole picture of such 
relations and the abuse that arises from commercializaiton. The scope and scale of 
commercialization as well as the higher education industry overall, the structure of the national 
economy in both absolute and relative terms, scale and scope, comprehensive statistical data, as 
well as estimates, predictions, and extrapolations would be very beneficial for the book. 
Presenting the scale and structure of the industries that influence higher education and higher 
education industry itself, along with the scale of their interaction, enriched by the predicted 
values of abuse and corruption in different forms seems to be an absolutely necessary part for 
this kind of research. The question of “how big are these processes nationwide?” is by and large 
left on the reader’s imagination and discretion. 
The book is distinct by its flamboyant journalistic stile, rather than the style that 
characterizes scholarly research. The book does not make a significant methodological 
contribution into the interdisciplinary subfield of corruption. It neither develops new nor uses 
already developed categories. Categorical apparatus normally utilized in research on corruption 
is almost absent. No research method in strict sense is used in the book. Some elements of the 
descriptive analysis may be found in the book, but no synthesis. There are no methods of 
induction or deduction used, and generalizations, presented by the author, are very vague and 
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incomplete. The structure of the book does not adhere closely to any particular scientific method 
of inquiry. The entire structure is focused on building the general line that substantiates the 
argument and supports the author’s position. There are no competing views or explanations 
presented in the book. This creates feeling of slight biasness in the judgments about the degree of 
corruptness of different practices of commercialization. The same is fare to say about 
conceptualization of the author’s agenda, presented in the book. 
Because of its unsophisticated methodological design, the book does not make a 
significant theoretical contribution to the field. It does not use explicitly theoretical frames or 
lenses, nor does it create new theories or even makes incremental, new developments. 
The book is a culmination of writings on commercialization of the U.S. higher education. 
It stands in one row with works of Ashford (1983), Caldert (1983), Johnson (1984), Aslanian et 
al. (1988), Duggan et al. (1988), Fairweather (1988), Boyles (1998), Oblinger and Verville 
(1998), Newfield (2003), Molnar (2005), and others. In distinction of these books, Washburn 
does not present a theoretically sophisticated research. Her work is limited by descriptive 
analysis. It may be considered as a culmination of works on commercialization of higher 
education and especially those focused on negative impact of such process on the primary 
mission of academia in a sense that it first uses term “corruption” in its title, even though it takes 
a meaning of a process rather than a fact. For this reason the book is neither groundbreaking nor 
revolutionary one. It can not be viewed as a revolutionary work first of all because of the absence 
of a substantial theoretical and methodological contribution to the interdisciplinary field of 
corruption as well as by the lack of sophisticated theoretical lenses and frameworks applied in 
the research. It is obvious that deeper theoretical developments are needed. The book does not 
bear any methodological novelty, clear definitions and operational categories, and new methods. 
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One of the flaws we would also like to point out is that the book does not appreciate or 
support plurality of forms in its study of higher education--industry nexus. The author stands on 
unitary positions and apparently ignores the fact that the system is already diverse and continues 
its development along the lines of plurality of forms of ownership, management, and governance. 
Also, all attention is given to Ivy League schools and some of the “wanna be” universities, while 
most of the higher education institutions are left aside, even though they provide most of the 
educational services in the nation. Higher education may not be limited to the major research 
universities and would be diseases, attributed to them and caused by their close ties with 
businesses, are not a characteristic for the entire higher education industry. 
There are many aspects of university-industry relations that were left aside, including 
intrusion of the defense industry, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTCs), and varsity sports 
or intercollegiate athletics as a part of sport industry. It would be interesting to see if there are 
any pockets for corruption created by these ties and what exactly they are. Another aspect that 
was left unattended is about the fact that people come to academia from industries, public sector, 
and government. Some of these newly appointed professors, researchers, administrators, and 
physicians were practicing corruption in their institutions and now bring culture of corruption 
into the world of scholarship. Discovering such aspects would be way more productive and 
beneficial to the issue of corruption than pointing out how much the indicators of educational 
debts of recent graduates have risen over the last decades. 
Finally, while describing the industry as something alien to academia, the author does not 
want to fully accept the fact that academia is constantly changing, and it has a right to do so. 
Higher education does not have to be very distinct from what is considered as traditional 
industries or business. Higher education itself is an industry. As the mass media does not just 
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work for the corporate world any more but is itself a part of the corporate world, higher 
education institutions will become more and more of corporations and processes of teaching and 
learning, research, and provision of healthcare services will adopt businesslike models. The 
author has every right to consider such processes as negatively affecting the public interest, but 
she has yet to substantiate her stance. 
The book would be of high interest for policymakers, managers, and theorists. While 
policymakers, university administrators, and business managers will appreciate good description 
of forms of cooperation of industries and universities as well as problems that such cooperation 
creates or exacerbates and some of the prescriptions, offered by the author, theorists will find 
wealth of material on which to build some concepts and theories of social and ethical 
responsibility versus commercialization and perhaps even some interesting niches for possible 
corrupt activities in higher education. 
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